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Energy, uncertainty, and entrepreneurship 
John D Rockefeller’s sequential approach to transaction costs 
management in the early oil industry 
 
Jose A. Bolanos1 
Abstract 
This article delves into the challenge of successful entrepreneurship in the energy industry 
under conditions of uncertainty by examining the case of John D Rockefeller’s Standard Oil 
Company, which rapidly seized control of an initially-uncertain industry. It finds that 
Rockefeller cemented control through a willingness to internalise contextual uncertainty 
(related to the nature of the energy business) as a stepping stone to managing contractual 
uncertainty (related to transactions with other parties). This finding suggests that thinking 
sequentially about the management of contextual and contractual uncertainty aids 
entrepreneurial success in the field of energy. This suggestion accords with standing calls in 
the transaction costs literature, which means that findings may generalise to some extent. 
However, the exploratory nature of the analysis implies the need for further research about 
the argument’s compatibility with modern energy practices and its generalisability. Word 
count: 7977. 
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1. Introduction 
A renowned investment manager recently stated that “the only certain thing about oil's price 
is its uncertainty” [1]. The World Bank expressed concern about the challenge that 
regulatory, technological, and climate uncertainty means for clean energy technologies [2]. A 
prominent forum noted that “future regulatory uncertainty makes it difficult for investors to 
formulate risk and return expectations, causing hesitation and preventing capital inflows” [3]. 
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In sum: in the energy industry, uncertainty is a hurdle to entrepreneurship, defined here as the 
agent-led “process of creating new value (an innovation and/or a new organization)” [4]. In 
the context of a world that aspires for a more sustainable energy system, uncertainty is 
troubling. It can have a “paralysing effect on decision-making within institutions that are 
accustomed to dealing with challenges under a ‘predict-then-act’ paradigm [5]. There is, 
therefore, a need to study how to overcome uncertainty in the field of energy.  
The author means ‘uncertainty’, not ‘risk’. An analogy that helps differentiate the 
concepts is the game of Russian roulette. Russian roulette entails a 1/n – ε possibility of 
death, where 'n' is the number of chambers in the gun and 'ε' the unknown possibility of a 
malfunction. The original game, thus, is more about risk than about uncertainty but, if players 
cannot count the chambers in the gun or work out the chances of a malfunction, the game 
becomes one of uncertainty. Energy entrepreneurs, who are key to the possibility of an 
energy transition, do not play Russian roulette. However, in the field of energy, much 
uncertainty escapes elimination. So, the rationale applies: gauging risk without information is 
impossible, and energy entrepreneurs often act in such daunting circumstances. In the context 
of the need for a sustainable energy transition, it is therefore vital to study ‘uncertainty’ as a 
challenge in and of itself. 
This article dives into ‘uncertainty’, as such, by recalling that while it poses a 
challenge, uncertainty is also the source of entrepreneurial possibility [6]: 
In a well-organized society, if business men know either (1) what actual changes 
are impending or (2) the "risks" they run… the effect in the long run is the same; 
the only result of such changes will be a certain redistribution of productive 
energy which will take place continuously and without any disturbance of perfect 
competitive conditions. 
This view is valid in the field of energy, where authors know that “uncertainty can both 
create opportunities for entrepreneurs to engage in emerging technologies, as well as hamper 
entrepreneurs in undertaking action” [7]. Unfortunately, while much has been written about 
the dynamic between uncertainty and aggregate realities such as oil prices [e.g., 8,9], new 
energy technologies [e.g., 10–12], and politics [e.g., 13,14], little has been written about how 
energy entrepreneurs can manage uncertainty individually. This focus is worrying because, 
being both a challenge and opportunity, at the aggregate level uncertainty will undoubtedly 
cause many failures. Focusing on uncertainty’s potential to cause failures may lead to a 
pessimistic view of uncertainty, which would lead to it being misrepresented. 
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The puzzle concealed in the fact that entrepreneurs need to overcome uncertainty is the 
question of whether some strategies are better than others at managing uncertainty (the 
alternative being that entrepreneurs need sheer luck to overcome it). This puzzle is too large 
to address at once, so this paper focuses on a related but much more specific research 
question: how did John D Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company manage uncertainty? As seen 
later, the case is fitting for an article about energy entrepreneurship amidst uncertainty. 
Moreover, Standard was pivotal to one of the greatest transitions in the history of energy: the 
1860-1910 ramp up of the oil industry [15]. 
Section 2 presents the theory. Section 3 introduces the method of analysis. Section 4 
and Section 5 analyse and discuss Standard’s case. Conclusions, in Section 6, summarise and 
call for further research. 
2. Theory  
The property-rights approach to transaction costs (TCs) can account for uncertainty being 
both a challenge and an opportunity for entrepreneurs. This approach is traceable to Coase’s 
explanation of the emergence of firms [16,17]:  
The entrepreneur has to carry out his function at less cost, taking into account the 
fact that he may get factors of production at a lower price than the market 
transactions he supersedes, because it is always possible to revert to the open 
market if he fails to do this.  
When two or more parties agree (the contract) that the entrepreneur will deliver tangible 
wealth (the property) to users for a given price (the mechanism), entrepreneurs must cover 
costs for raw ingredients plus all other costs arising from the need to transact with others, and 
they must do so more efficiently than competitors. Uncertainty is variously present in the 
entrepreneurial process, so it stands to reason that entrepreneurs who deal with uncertainty 
efficiently will likely deliver their products or services at a lower cost than competitors (or a 
higher benefit at a comparable cost). The challenge, but also the opportunity, is managing 
uncertainty better than competitors. 
TCs matter in the energy industry. The industry is fertile ground for integration [18], 
and both vertical and horizontal types of integration can reduce TCs [19–21]. Vertical 
integration brings external operations under the entrepreneur’s control: the equilibrium is 
where the entrepreneur becomes more efficient than the collective firms that would otherwise 
play a part in the process. Horizontal integration widens the pool of options available to an 
entrepreneur: the equilibrium is where the gains from diversification outweigh the costs of 
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doing so. For both, however, the existence of an equilibrium implies the need for information. 
It is impossible to know how much to integrate, or in what direction, or when, or how, 
without information.  
Information challenges notwithstanding, energy entrepreneurs can look into the idea of 
energy security as a broad guide to what the market desires. Despite the ambiguities that 
surround energy security, commentators agree that “large, flexible, and well-functioning 
energy markets provide security by absorbing shocks and allowing supply and demand to 
respond more quickly and with greater ingenuity than a controlled system could” [22]. So, the 
world sees energy markets as a way to achieve energy security. Energy entrepreneurs are 
central to the functioning of energy markets, even if failures are always possible and non-
market mechanisms may be necessary complements [23]. It stands to reason, then, that much 
of the uncertainty of the energy business is tightly linked to the uncertainty associated with 
prominent energy security challenges. 
The most notable energy security challenges are the ‘availability’, ‘accessibility’, and 
‘affordability’ concerns that came to prominence in the 1970s, and the various considerations 
of social, political, and environmental ‘acceptability’ highlighted afterwards [23–25]. The 
Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC) [26] recently brought these factors together to 
produce the ‘4A’ model. This article uses APERC’s model, with two minor modifications: 
firstly, the addition of ‘adaptability’ due to the need for the alignment of energy technologies 
and production platforms, and, secondly, the treatment of ‘affordability’ as a ‘+A’ factor to 
highlight that affordability can be affected by other ‘As’ and by exogenous factors [27]. The 
result is a functional view of energy security with five variables: availability, accessibility, 
acceptability, adaptability, and affordability (4A+A).2 
For this article, these 4A+A factors also point to an expectation: entrepreneurial 
strategies that absorb or internalise uncertainty related to energy availability (E1) / 
accessibility (E2) / acceptability (E3) / adaptability (E4) / affordability (E5) will contribute to 
success amidst uncertainty. While straightforward, this expectation is daring in the context of 
modern energy because many in the field try to avoid uncertainty through collective 
[neoclassical] efforts aimed at gathering better information and improving governance [e.g., 
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29–33]. By confirming or rejecting this expectation, this paper helps to establish if Standard’s 
strategies support modern practices in the field of energy. 
It is worth mentioning before moving to the methods section that models similar to the 
4A+A exist outside of energy. Cherp and Jewell [28], for example, mention a model by 
Penchansky and Thomas that examines the “degree of ‘fit’ between the clients and the 
system” in the health services industry [34]. Their model looks into the availability, 
accessibility, accommodation, affordability, and acceptability of health services. Another 
example is the field of food security. Here, the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization defines food security through availability, access, utilisation and stability, 
where utilisation is a nutritional measure of how adaptable food is to the human body and 
stability refers to adequate continuous intake [35,36]. There is, also, a model of food security 
based on considerations of availability, accessibility, adequacy, acceptability, and agency 
[37]. This article cannot claim direct relevance to these fields because it focuses on energy. 
Similarly, as elaborated below, the method limits the generalisability of the argument. 
However, the fact that the 4A+A has non-energy parallels opens room to contemplate the 
argument’s applicability beyond energy. 
3. Method 
Rockefeller’s Standard faced significant uncertainty. Political uncertainty, due to the recently 
concluded American Civil War and other conflicts at the international level such as the 
Franco-Prussian War [38]. Market uncertainty, because the energy industry at the time was 
fertile terrain for speculators [38].3 Technological uncertainty, because the industry featured 
new and competing technologies, namely the coal-based kerosene recently discovered by 
Canadian geologist Abraham Gesner [39]. In addition, the period saw not one but two oil 
gluts, the first precipitated by a production rush following George Bissel and associates’ 
discovery in 1859 [38,40,41] and a subsequent swing after the Civil War [41]. It is hard to pin 
down the exact level of uncertainty of the combined challenges. Uncertainty may well be as 
difficult to conceptualise as the number ‘zero’, so the very idea that it can be measured, 
ranked, or compared, needs exploration. However, the challenge was great, particularly for an 
entrepreneur who, despite being remembered as a rich man, came into the business as a 
humble merchant of daily produce. Standard, nonetheless, “brought ‘order out of chaos—
                                                 
3
 Speculation is not necessarily negative, as it can drive financial incentives up. The subjectivity of speculation, however, 
makes it hard to find certainty in it. 
Energy, uncertainty, and entrepreneurship 
6 
 
Rockefeller euphemism for monopoly” [42]. If there is such a thing as a succesful approach 
to entrepreneurship amidst uncertainty, Standard is an outstanding place to start exploring.  
There is room for tension about how to approach single cases in the context of energy 
research and the social sciences. On the one hand, single case analyses lack the robustness 
(the extent to which findings are stable) and generalisability (the extent to which findings 
inform our understanding of other cases) associated with other methods. Likewise, trying to 
automatically compare a case as old as Rockefeller’s Standard with modern cases of energy 
entrepreneurship risks falling into the ‘apples and oranges’ fallacy [cf. 43]. This consideration 
does not mean the comparison is impossible, but it does mean that additional research is 
needed to determine the extent to which comparability exists. Limitations notwithstanding, 
authors agree that there is value in using single cases for exploratory analysis. They “are 
useful for exploration and for generating hypotheses – for creating new conjectures in a sort 
of ‘light bulb’ moment” [44] and, if well chosen, a single case can go as far as to enable the 
testing of expectations/hypotheses [45]. It is too early to speak of general theories about 
energy entrepreneurship amidst uncertainty. So, this article starts by grounding debate in an 
exploration of what seems to be an uncontroversial instance of significant entrepreneurial 
success amidst uncertainty. 
On the other hand, even single cases are implicitly comparative, because selection 
follows considerations relevant to a broader set of cases [46]. Qualitative studies can claim 
‘analytical generalisation’ when driven by a logic applicable elsewhere, and when the cases 
are comparable to those elsewhere [47]. This article builds on theory applicable across the 
world of energy. Moreover, Rockefeller shared the foundational challenge faced by all energy 
entrepreneurs: the existence of a threshold at which activities must cease due to what Taleb 
[48] refers to as an “absorbing barrier” from which there is no recovery, i.e., ruin. The plight 
of entrepreneurship amidst uncertainty is that the more uncertain a situation is, the harder it is 
for an entrepreneur to trust its ability to avoid ruin. In this sense, Standard’s case is 
comparable, to a degree deserving further research, to that of all energy entrepreneurs 
(perhaps even to all entrepreneurs). So, while the findings here speak directly only of the 
Standard, there is room for some generalisability. 
In sum, then, a single case exploration can help to confirm primitive expectations that 
may or may not apply to other cases, but that can, in itself, advance research. This is, indeed, 
the goal here: to confirm the expectations given earlier and identify room for further research.  
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4. Analysis 
Rockefeller entered the oil industry in the early-1860s and, by 1870 he held some 4% of the 
refining market [49,50]. He then created the Standard Oil Company in Cleveland, which grew 
rapidly. Standard’s share of the market by the end of the 1970s was somewhere between 80% 
and 95%  [42,51]. Standard saw increased competition from the late-1880s, but its dominion 
only ended when the US Supreme Court broke the company apart in 1911. Even then, the 
resulting companies became some of the biggest energy conglomerates that exist to date. 
Guided by the 4A+A, this section explores how Standard approached uncertainty. 
Before entering specifics, however, it is essential to recall that there was a single 
guiding rationale underneath all of Rockefeller’s actions: control. Rockefeller was aware of 
there being an opportunity in uncertainty. For example, in his autobiography, Rockefeller 
tells the story of a partner to whom he lent money for an uncertain investment on the 
condition that the partner would only need to repay the money if the investment turned 
profitable [52]. That said, his actions sought uncertainty only instrumentally, as his goal was 
invariably ‘control’ (and had been since he was young, when, “to ensure that he won, he 
submitted to games only where he could dictate the rules” [53]). So, the sections below 
analyse how Rockefeller approached the uncertainty associated with the 4A+A challenges in 
pursuit of control, but they do not suggest that Rockefeller himself thought in 4A+A terms. 
4.1. Availability (via location) 
Early oil entrepreneurs had three options regarding location: next to production centres, next 
to markets, or somewhere in between. While refiners located next to production centres had 
more insight into, and influence over, local dynamics, oil availability was scattered across 
states [54]. Cleveland is somewhat in between production centres in Pennsylvania, West 
Virginia, Indiana and Kentucky. The opportunity to aggregate oil from different suppliers 
grew as the size of the industry increased. Location enabled supply diversification. However, 
Rockefeller could not have known this for certain when he chose Cleveland. Production 
concentrated initially in Pennsylvania and West Virginia, which are next to each other. 
Indiana and Kentucky only became significant supply regions by the mid-1870s and early-
1880s. Unsurprisingly, at the outset, those close to production centres felt safe, even boasting 
of the future with certainty [38]. In turn, concerning supply, Rockefeller bore more initial 
uncertainty than many competitors. 
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The other half of Rockefeller’s location strategy relates to demand. Centralised refiners 
near big markets were able to exploit economies of scale too. By 1872, for example, New 
York’s refining capacity was only ~20% lower than Cleveland’s [38]. New York also had an 
advantage over Cleveland regarding the initial level of uncertainty. New York was a massive 
market, so it was not unwarranted for local refiners to see their proximity to consumers as a 
source of certainty. It was easier to ship oil to New York to refine and sell locally than to ship 
the oil to Cleveland, refine it in Cleveland, send the kerosene to New York, and then trade in 
New York. However, in pursuit of certainty, entrepreneurs can corner themselves into a 
situation where they block the possibilities that come with uncertainty. In this particular case, 
that corner was New York, which was as far away as possible from emerging city markets 
such as St. Louis and Chicago. So, from a demand perspective, Rockefeller initially bore 
more uncertainty than refiners in New York, but when markets developed westwards 
Standard’s location enabled more horizontal integration, this time at the demand level. 
Standard never stopped organising operations according to this ‘middle-point’ 
rationale. Standard’s expansion, which took place between the late-1880s and the 1910s, 
went as far as to create the Vacuum Oil Company AG in 1904, a Vienna-based subsidiary 
that invested ~$3 million by 1910 despite fierce opposition by the local government [55]. 
Having a foothold in Vienna was important because the region was a major producing centre 
with favourable access to all European submarkets. The rate of oil discoveries in the United 
States limited the ‘middle-point’ strategy, but it followed a similar pattern. A good example is 
an interplay between Standard’s approach to California and Texas. California’s oil production 
only ignited after output in the region went from 2.6 million barrels in 1889 to 24.3 million in 
1903 [56]. Standard had already set up shop in California in 1900 with the objective of 
enlarging market presence [56]. When the boom came, Standard acted rapidly by repeating 
the middle-point recipe, which led it to holding ~75% of the refining market by the turn of 
the century [56]. However, Standard did not show much interest in Texas due to geological 
miscalculations by staff, animosity with the local elites, a mismatch between the type of oil in 
Texas and Standard’s traditional supply and, importantly, thinking that its California 
operations were sufficiently close to service the region [54,57,58]. Texas turned out to be 
essential to accessing foreign markets, however, so not setting operations there was a 
mistake. A mistake that shows how much Standard believed in its ‘middle-point’ rationale. 
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4.2. Accessibility (via transportation) 
Some see Rockefeller’s management of accessibility to/from oil/markets via the control of 
transportation as the reason Standard succeeded [e.g., 38,49]. This article shows that all other 
4A+A factors also played a role, but there is no denying that transportation was vital. 
Much uncertainty existed in transportation. The infrastructure was in development, and 
secret rebates and the intentional misclassification of freight by railroad companies were 
common [59]. ‘Secret’, however, refers not to a situation where nobody knew about the 
practice. What nobody knew was ‘who’ got exactly ‘what’. In such a situation, the natural 
response is for each entrepreneur to aim for as many and as large rebates as possible. 
Accordingly, Rockefeller was amongst the first to pursue rebates [38], but he was not the sole 
beneficiary [60]. So, the rebates were a source of uncertainty because although they were 
common knowledge, actionable information about relative transportation costs did not exist. 
The turning point was the South Improvement Company, a cartel initiative that sought 
to lower uncertainty for both railroads and refiners [61]: 
Competition among the railroads led to price wars… [which] led Scott [from the 
Pennsylvania Railroad Company] to try to limit competition among the railroads 
by creating the South Improvement Company, a railroad cartel consisting of the 
Erie, New York Central, and Pennsylvania railroads, which set prices and freight 
volumes to prevent rate wars and establish advantageous shipping prices for the 
railroads. 
The matter of who brought who into the scheme is debatable. Some believe that the railroads 
included the region’s largest refiners [49, cf. 60]. Others claim that Rockefeller got the idea 
from other refiners [40]. Initially, though, Rockefeller did not seem enamoured with the 
scheme and may have only joined after considerable persuasion [40]. What did happen after, 
however, is that Rockefeller manoeuvred his and his partners’ shares so that Standard would 
have formal control of the initiative [40]. In other words, he took over the initiative before the 
cartel materialised and then designed it to his advantage, to the point that the result included 
means to gain information about competitors’ shipments [40].  
Investing in taking control of a cartel is similar to buying a different organisation to 
bring it under control, i.e., vertical integration, so the strategy itself is about managing 
contractual TCs. However, Rockefeller acted before knowing if the South Improvement 
Company was viable. In doing so, he effectively broke the process of integration into a two-
step sequence. Firstly, he invested in internalising all the uncertainty of the cartel, then, 
secondly, he designed rules to lower his contractual TCs. Proof of his willingness to take on 
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significant uncertainty is that, this time, Rockefeller failed as public outcry led to the collapse 
of the South Improvement Company initiative and a blockade against Standard [38,62]. In 
other words, Rockefeller invested when the cartel’s future was still uncertain, but the cartel 
did not come to fruition, to Rockefeller’s disappointment [40]. 
Rockefeller still profited from the South Improvement Company. Once again, however, 
the key was seeing possibility in uncertainty, or at least to fear it less than competitors. While 
the South Improvement Company was still a possibility, he capitalised on the fear of an 
uncertain future by getting others to sell their operations to him at unfavourable prices [40]. 
Integration, once again. Sequential integration, though. At the time of bidding, Standard was 
still a similar size to other refiners. Placing so many independent bids put Rockefeller in the 
dark about what the outcome would be, and costs would have been incurred regardless. He 
was an outstanding deal-maker, however. So, by the time he finished, Standard had the scale 
needed to control the railroads. Then, finally at that point, “what did he [Rockefeller] do? … 
He got a rebate” [40]. That is, he used his newly-privileged position to reduce his contractual 
TCs. He allowed participation by other “large shippers, who could guarantee large and 
regular shipments and could threaten to ship by other routes, [who] were granted rebates by 
the railroads” [62]. However, Standard cared for relative advantages [61] and its newly 
enlarged size sufficed to ensure an advantage vis-à-vis all other refiners. 
4.3. Adaptability (via innovation) 
Refining was an attractive business at the time [40]. It also made sense for Rockefeller to 
give refining a try because he was a merchant of daily produce which, at that time, meant that 
he traded some oil as part of his previous activities [63]. However, Rockefeller entered the 
business only after internalising technological uncertainty by convincing the British inventor 
Samuel Andrews to be a partner. The partnership mattered. Rockefeller could have avoided 
giving shares by hiring average technologists. Instead, he parted with a significant share of 
his company to acquire Andrews, who proved to be nothing short of a genius and was able to 
transform bitumen into kerosene much more efficiently than others [40]. Without Andrews, 
Standard would have been dependent on the market for innovation. With Andrews, Standard 
had someone under its roof tasked with continuously dealing with the technological 
uncertainty imposed on energy entrepreneurs by the need to adapt raw resources into usable 
fuels.  
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The size of the resulting advantage is a matter of debate. Some believe that Standard’s 
pre-1870 success was “solely on account of its superior efficiency” [50]. Others claim that 
refiners in the region were not that far behind [40]. Regardless, the advantage existed. 
Multiplied by scale, it would have made a difference. Once again, however, the strategy was 
sequential. The first step was to incur the cost of bringing someone on to tackle adaptability. 
Efficiencies only came as a result of that move. Now, Andrews grew increasingly unhappy 
with Rockefeller’s aggressiveness during the 1870s and sold his shares to Rockefeller in 1880 
[64], but he left behind a culture of innovation [65]. In doing so, he ensured that Standard 
would not have to rely on the market to overcome technological uncertainty.  
Inevitably, Standard would miss an innovation or two. When this happened, however, 
the company flexed its financial muscle. Crucial to the argument here is the fact that rather 
than merely paying to get access to market technologies, Rockefeller pursued external 
innovation with the goal of internalising it. An excellent example was the late-1880s purchase 
of patents related to an invention by Hermann Frasch, which enabled the purification of 
sulphur-rich oils. Frasch initially worked for Standard but was underappreciated, so he 
developed and patented his method independently. Rather than just getting access to the 
process, however, “Rockefeller paid a handsome price to acquire the Frasch properties and 
bring Frasch back into the Standard fold” [66]. Standard internalised both the technology and 
the innovator. The investment worked. Standard became able to use sulphur-rich oil, cheaper 
than other oils, without a loss in quality. Having exclusive access to the best techniques 
equates to some degree of control over competitors. This final control, however, does not 
change the fact that Rockefeller sunk the cost on the possibility of a satisfactory outcome, 
rather than the certainty of it. 
Refining saw substantial improvements during the 1870s [50], and the 1880s saw an 
explosion of genius elsewhere. At least one competitor, a company called Branobel, short for 
‘Nobel brothers’ in Russian, rivalled Standard’s in-house innovation capacity [67]. Alongside 
the increase in expertise under other roofs came an erosion of Standard’s market share, which 
shows that being par to the market in adaptability is not enough for control. Being 
comparatively superior, though, may require investing in little more than hope and trust in the 
capacities of innovators, as did Rockefeller with Andrews. 
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4.4. Acceptability (via quality)  
Frasch’s assistant, William Burton, reportedly got his surname appended to Frasch’s 
invention for helping to convince large customers of the quality of the output [66]. Burton 
might well have been an outstanding assistant that deserved credit nonetheless, but the fact 
that he has a place in history due to having helped to spread acceptance for Frasch’s invention 
shows the importance of the matter.  
The fact that Standard cared about acceptance is not a surprise. The entire region of 
Cleveland marketed itself as having an “immovable reputation for the quantity and quality of 
this most important product” [40]. To the extent that Standard was part of Cleveland, the 
company must have benefited from certainty collectively derived from the region’s 
reputation. Rockefeller, however, was not content with just being part of the region’s 
prestige. His desire to stand out even amongst Cleveland’s refiners was such that the name of 
the company, ‘Standard Oil’, was chosen a symbolic statement amidst concerns for the safety 
of other oils [43]. This willingness to be a direct point of reference was bold, given that 
people were not fond of Rockefeller or his company. On the contrary, as noted earlier, the 
Standard was publicly vilified in the context of the South Improvement Company. 
Retailers would still prefer to buy from Standard because of confidence in the quality of 
his product [64], because “even the most anti-Rockefeller muckrakers conceded the high 
quality of operations at the Standard” [63]. Acceptance, thus, was built on a twofold strategy. 
Part of this strategy related to the considerations in the previous section. In a nutshell, better 
technology results in a better product. The full formula, however, also involved an additional, 
and rather daring, element. Rockefeller embraced the idea of oil as a dangerous product. 
Effectively, then, he invested in making oil uncertain in the eyes of consumers. Only, he 
exempted his company from the resulting fears by also investing in marketing that 
highlighted the quality of Standard’s oil. 
It is easy to see how this strategy led to control when looking at events retrospectively. 
At the time, however, heightening doubts about the nature of the product while also placing 
his brand in direct contact with audiences was courageous, particularly considering how 
poorly Rockefeller did at managing audiences during the South Improvement Company 
episode. Nonetheless, the strategy worked. The savings are impossible to calculate, but the 
implementation was so fantastic that the very usage of the word ‘standard’ became a branding 
fashion after the Standard Oil Company [68].  
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Eventually, Standard moved to reduce other non-fixed costs by removing the 
middlemen from the logistical equation [20]. The move represented an act of integration, this 
time into the distribution level. At the time, normal distribution channels were so inefficient 
that “all Rockefeller's laboriously wrought economies were thrown away when the oil passed 
into the hands of the jobber” [64]. Standard, instead, operated with religious efficiency at all 
levels.  
Standard did not expand geographically until the late-1880s, which makes it hard to 
argue that there was a rush to integrate into retailing elsewhere. However, geographical 
expansion was catalysed at least partially by the desire for acceptance, as evidenced by the 
fact that Standard only started to discuss expansion around 1885, when existing price 
advantages and bad-mouthing of competitors proved insufficient to counter market 
penetration by other companies [43]. 
4.5. [+] Affordability (via corporate governance) 
There are visible links between considerations related to all factors noted thus far and the 
final affordability (+A) of Rockefeller’s enterprise. Standard became more affordable to run 
every time non-fixed costs fell following actions related to any ‘A’. Rockefeller was then 
able to choose if he wanted to keep the savings for the benefit of Standard or pass them onto 
customers, a normative question that falls outside the scope of this article. The interlinkages 
are part of the reason why affordability is separate from other ‘A’ factors. As noted earlier, 
however, the other part of the reason why affordability is separated into a ‘+A’ factor is that it 
can also be affected by efforts exogenous to the other ‘A’ factors. In Standard’s case, the 
most significant such effort was Rockefeller’s interest in efficient management. 
Another of Standard’s founding partners, Henry M. Flagler, was vital in this regard. 
Flagler came into the picture before the incorporation of the company, around the same time 
as Rockefeller and his original partner, Maurice Clark, had a falling-out. Flagler was behind 
both the decision to turn the company public in 1870 [69] and the decision to turn the 
company into a trust in 1882 [70]. The incorporation in 1870 was in line with the best 
management practices of the time [64]. Not necessarily in the oil industry, where lousy 
management abounded [65], but on par with practices elsewhere. The re-organisation into a 
Trust in 1882, however, was nothing short of an innovation in management [71]. The change 
sought to bring efficiency into the administration of what had become a gigantic system of 
interlocked entrepreneurial efforts by integrating the management of it [51]: 
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… "for convenience of control and management the Standard Oil Trust was 
formed… an agreement, placing all the stock of these various companies in the 
hands of trustees, declaring the terms on which they were held, and providing for 
the issuance of a certificate showing the amount of each owner's interest in the 
stock so held in trust… [that] did not in any essential manner change the 
character of the association previously existing… [but] was simply a common 
ownership of stock in various corporations… [because] it seemed preferable, 
instead of organizing one corporation in New York, to organize a corporation in 
each State where business was being carried on, so that the business transacted 
in each State might be conducted by a home corporation…” 
Regardless of intentions, though, the idea of the Trust was novel. By going through with it, 
Standard went beyond internalising uncertainty. Instead, it directly created uncertainty for 
itself by locking its future into a change for which no precedent existed. 
The result was satisfactory. The reorganisation created “an extensive system of 
reporting by the individual companies and of personal consultation [that] contributed to 
making centralized coordination and control of decentralized management of operations 
reasonably effective” [71]. The new system was not perfect. Distances and external 
management of some operations weakened the effort [71]. However, the system sufficed to 
support the subsequent process of further vertical and horizontal integration that followed, 
and one that led to Standard becoming fully-integrated by the 1890s [54,70,71]. 
5. Discussion 
Rockefeller saw possibility in his decisions. Perhaps he even self-confidently believed in his 
capacity to produce a particular outcome. Entrepreneurs engage in prospective thinking as 
part of the normal entrepreneurial experience. So, Rockefeller could have perhaps gone as far 
as to specifically consider how to best organise uncertainty [72]. This argument does not 
deny that uncertainty can be reduced into measurable, or at least categorisable, bits. 
Retrospectively, in fact, almost everything is measurable. The point here, however, is to 
inquire into what good entrepreneurship amidst uncertainty is, which requires examining how 
entrepreneurs choose between one or another organising strategy. In this sense, the analysis 
indicates that when Rockefeller made the investments needed to have/build proprietary 
solutions for each 4A+A challenge, he did so on account of little more than entrepreneurial 
instinct. Moreover, the analysis also shows that Standard’s strategies diverged from those by 
competitors and were, for the most part, untested; daring, even. Therefore, the analysis 
confirms that, for Rockefeller’s Standard, the willingness to invest in strategies bearing more 
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uncertainty than those of competitors contributed to success amidst uncertainty, which 
confirms all expectations. 
The key to understanding how the strategy worked is the exact sequence of steps that 
underpin Standard’s strategies, namely, an initial act of internalising contextual challenges, 
proxied here by the 4A+A factors and devising proprietary solutions to them, and then, the 
subsequent use of these solutions to reduce the costs of transacting with others. The sequence 
is evident concerning availability and accessibility, for example, where Rockefeller set up 
shop in a supply/demand middle-point before oil discoveries had been finalised and before 
markets developed westwards, which then enabled diversification of both supply and 
demand. The sequence is also noticeable concerning adaptability, where Rockefeller even 
parted with a share of his company to bring Andrews under his roof, solely in the hope that 
Andrews would provide efficient solutions across the entire technological dimension. Actual 
gains in efficiency, however, only materialised after Andrews joined the company. It is not as 
easy to appreciate the sequence concerning acceptability and affordability because actions on 
these fronts were fuzzier than in other areas. However, the linking of Standard’s brand with 
the fears associated with the safety of oil logically precedes customers’ discrimination against 
other brands due to safety concerns. Had only the first part of the strategy worked, namely 
Standard’s implied acceptance of oil as inherently dangerous, Rockefeller would have been 
discriminated against, along with other competitors. Similarly, the willingness to re-organise 
an entire company into a new untested managerial model is tantamount to diving ‘head-first’ 
into a completely uncertain way of doing business, with managerial efficiencies only coming 
after the reorganisation. 
Of course, it is easy to justify all of Rockefeller’s strategies in hindsight; perhaps even 
call them obvious. However, no entrepreneur, not even Rockefeller, can predict the future. 
On all fronts, Rockefeller invested in unique, independent strategies in the domains of the 
4A+A factors without knowing what the future would bring. In a way, he trusted his ability to 
mould the future in his favour. Invariably, however, the proprietary solutions for the 4A+A 
challenges improved Rockefeller’s bargaining position, which then led to controlling 
suppliers, competitors, and consumers. And so, we get the sequence of steps by which 
Rockefeller approached the uncertainty of his business: first, devise proprietary solutions to 
the 4A+A challenges, then, second, use these solutions to reduce the costs of transacting with 
other actors in the market. 
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The sequence behind Standard’s strategies is fascinating from the perspective of the 
literature about TCs. As noted earlier, market transactions happen, always, in the context of 
one or another form of contract. Saying that Standard’s actions toward the 4A+A factors 
equated to the ability to minimise the costs of transacting with others is the same as saying 
that Standard’s actions toward the 4A+A factors equated to the ability to minimise 
contractual costs. In turn, this analysis highlights the need to differentiate between the costs 
associated with overcoming contextual uncertainty (related to the nature of the energy 
business, proxied here by the 4A+A challenges) and contractual uncertainty (related to 
interactions with other parties). As such, the findings here can be rephrased as follows: 
Standard’s proprietary mastery of contextual uncertainty enabled it to control contractual 
uncertainty. 
The author is unaware of a view of uncertainty management as a sequential approach to 
the management of TCs that is as succinct as that in the previous paragraph’s last sentence. 
However, the property rights approach to TCs does acknowledge the benefit of understanding 
contextual and contractual uncertainty as logically distinct. Initially, distinction emerged from 
concern about overstretching the TCs concept by using it indiscriminately for all costs of 
operating as a firm [73]. Later, the distinction was cemented as authors chose to focus on the 
management of contractual uncertainty. For example, Munger’s [74] recent explanation of 
the sharing economy as a vehicle for economy-wide TC reductions focuses on contracts by 
formally externalising the management of contextual uncertainty as a matter of “natural 
selection”. Lately, the field has even seen the emergence of writings about environmental 
[contextual] uncertainty that acknowledge the need for understanding contextual and 
contractual uncertainty as sequential [75]. 
The paragraph above shows that the TC literature converged into a sequential view in a 
fairly organic manner, and very slowly. Even today, despite acknowledgement and interest, 
the literature still struggles slightly when it comes to explaining the management of 
uncertainty [76]. A fascinating aspect of Standard’s case is that it already operated with a 
sequential approach to managing contextual and contractual uncertainty a full half-century 
before Coase even suggested the TCs concept. This fact should not be taken lightly, as it 
speaks of the value of having a good entrepreneurial instinct. That said, fascination aside, the 
TC literature’s organic move into acknowledging the need for a sequential view of contextual 
and contractual uncertainty does mean that the findings here are fully compatible with said 
literature. The cost of overcoming uncertainty is one of the most important TCs faced by 
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energy entrepreneurs. Success is more likely for entrepreneurs who, like Rockefeller, excel at 
managing uncertainty. And, a way to manage uncertainty excellently is to first invest in 
mastering contextual challenges such as the 4A+A and, then, to use this proprietary mastery 
to minimise contractual costs. 
Note, however, that Rockefeller’s strategies began by investing in proprietary solutions 
despite not knowing with certainty if these would deliver better or less costly solutions than 
competitors. This is an act of internalisation of contextual uncertainty. Before the investment, 
the uncertainty comes down to the question of whether an energy entrepreneur is or is not 
able to overcome the 4A+A challenges. After the investment, the uncertainty comes solely 
down to whether the energy entrepreneur can recuperate the cost of overcoming the 4A+A 
challenges. Contextual uncertainty is brought inwards by the act of investing in proprietary 
solutions. Clearly, the key is figuring out a way to ensure that said solutions are, indeed, 
better or less costly than those of competitors. Just hoping for it is unlikely to deliver this 
objective, though. So, there are two possibilities in this regard. Either Rockefeller was an 
incomparably lucky person, or he was an entrepreneurial genius because he internalised 
contextual uncertainty in a manner that maximised his ability to deliver better or less costly 
solutions than competitors. 
A plausible way to explain how Rockefeller made the most of his internalising of 
contextual uncertainty is to recall the multi-dimensionality of Standard’s strategies. 
Standard’s location addressed both availability and accesibility in parallel. Standard then used 
the subsequent reduction in contractual uncertainty (achieved by integrating supply and 
demand) to increase investment in transportation infrastructure that then led to even less 
uncertainty concerning accessibility. Likewise, Standard understood that Andrews’ role was 
not only to adapt bitumen into distilled product efficiently, but to do it in a way that led to a 
safe product that then enabled the company to tie its brand to considerations of acceptability, 
which creates a similar dynamic between adaptability, acceptability, and affordability. 
Finally, Standard’s continued pursuit of organisational efficiency bridged efforts across all 
4A+A factors by, firstly, bringing the company up to management benchmarks through its 
incorporation and, secondly, creating an original management structure that delivered even 
further efficiencies across the entire spectrum of operations. All of Standard’s strategies 
crossed over the 4A+A factors, back and forth, many times. 
The message that the multi-dimensional approach to the 4A+A factors sends is that, 
when it comes to uncertainty, more can be better. This statement may sound counterintuitive 
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if uncertainty is viewed pessimistically, as a total hindrance. However, it makes sense if 
uncertainty is viewed from a Knightian perspective as, also, opportunity. If uncertainty is a 
source of possibility, the absence of uncertainty limits manoeuvrability. Entrepreneurs willing 
to accept uncertainty along various dimensions have a degree of manoeuvrability that is not 
logically possible for entrepreneurs that avoid uncertainty.4 An equilibrium is implied, of 
course, but the exact point of equilibrium likely varies depending on conditions, so a single 
case analysis is not the place to enter the matter further.  
Despite the straightforwardness of the mechanisms covered thus far, and despite their 
compatibility with the property rights approach to TCs, there is much room for controversy in 
the above. To begin with, many of the practices in the field of energy are not so easy to 
reconcile with this argument. Consider, for example, the contradictions between Standard’s 
strategies and modern practices such as supply cuts and subsidies. These practices each 
emanate from an interest in a specific 4A+A factor, availability and affordability, 
respectively, while the analysis here suggests that multi-dimensional energy practices are 
superior. Moreover, while the fact that these practices seek to collectively manage contextual 
uncertainty implies an acceptance of the fact that contextual and contractual uncertainty are 
not one and the same, these efforts lump contextual and contractual uncertainty into a single 
initiative, contrary to the sequential approach that this analysis highlights. Furthermore, both 
supply cuts and subsidies are used to try to avoid some of the uncertainty around the 4A+A 
factors, while Standard’s case suggests that the individual entrepreneur should internalise 
uncertainty. 
There is, also, no denying that there are modern techniques that may render the modern 
energy entrepreneurship challenge different to that faced by Rockefeller. Consider, for 
instance, the increasing inclusion of qualitative considerations into the analysis of 
uncertainty. This trend seeks to move beyond the field’s emphasis on technical sources of 
uncertainty at the expense of social, political, and economic ones [5]. Authors associated with 
it have even criticised standing toolsets for their tendency to try and reduce what is either 
irreducible or not yet reduced at the time of necessary action [77]. As a result, they move 
away from an interest in the prediction of uncertainty and toward an interest in adapting to 
contingencies [77]. The type of analysis highlighted by these authors is one where human 
foresight combines with computational analysis to obtain a guide of the pathways open at any 
                                                 
4
 The former also spend less in analytics and contracting than the latter, but this is obvious. 
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given point in time [78]. This trend is not entirely inimical to the findings here. Most of the 
actions taken by Standard after internalising uncertainty opened pathways amicable to the 
company’s objectives. The idea of adapting to contingencies is compatible with a view of 
entrepreneurs as acting to open their preferred pathways. However, it may be a stretch to 
compare modern computer-assisted qualitative modelling with Rockefeller’s imagination.  
Consider, also, the ‘real options’ approach to investment under uncertainty, which 
gained traction in energy [e.g., 79–82] in the 1990s [83,84]. This approach acknowledges that 
investments have an irreversible component, but it also emphasises options as a mechanism 
to avoid some of the uncertainty by avoiding fully closed contracts during early stages [85]. 
In other words, today, entrepreneurs faced with uncertainty do not irrevocably sink 
investments. Instead, they can opt for investing in, say, stock associated with infrastructure, 
but also buy an option to have the right to sell this stock in the future. If the business goes 
awry, the entrepreneur sells and transfers the impact onto others. Implied in this chain of 
events is some degree of sequentiality, as the option defers part of the challenge posed by 
uncertainty, but the entrepreneur does internalise some uncertainty. Moreover, options, 
themselves a type of derivative (which implies this paragraph applies to derivatives, too), are 
private contracts, so the above-noted conundrum with collective contracts is not applicable. 
As a result, there is room for dialogue between the findings here and those in this literature, 
but also for controversy concerning the extent to which an entrepreneur should rely on this 
type of modern instruments. 
In summary, modern practices in energy mesh the Rockefeller-like management of 
uncertainty ‘upon action’ with its management through foresight and contracts. Two 
divergent arguments are possible from here. The first is that modern energy entrepreneurs can 
offset the need for directly managing certain aspects of the 4A+A factors by relying on 
modern information- or contract-driven initiatives. The second is that modern energy 
entrepreneurs who succeed in individually managing the 4A+A factors can more successfully 
profit from subsequent activities, whatever these may be. This argument is exploratory, so it 
is impossible to go beyond stating these two possibilities. Further research is necessary. 
Regardless, additional ideas, mechanisms, and hypotheses emerge from this analysis.  
It may be, for example, that Standard’s case is best interpreted as a warning rather than 
advice, given that Rockefeller was a monopolist and this type of entrepreneurial approach is 
discouraged nowadays. The question of compatibility with modern normative preferences can 
help ideating new research and hypotheses at the normative level. It may also be that 
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Standard is a good case to gain insight into a strategy that works amidst uncertainty, but that 
additional successful approaches exist too. This rationale is, at its core, a patronymic 
hypothesis of plurality, which calls for specifying different mechanisms that may also be 
sound approaches to managing uncertainty and engaging in empirical research upon them. 
Additionally, as usual, omissions and gaps necessarily exist, particularly given the single-case 
nature of the analysis, so further room for research exists in the inherently limited scope of 
the argument. Finally, as discussed before, while the findings here may be generalisable, the 
empirical evidence does not speak of the degree to which generalisation is possible. 
The need for further research notwithstanding, no amount of additional research can 
deny the facts. Rockefeller’s Standard succeeded amidst uncertainty. Axiomatically, there are 
lessons in it. 
6. Conclusions 
This article began by noting the concern for uncertainty that exists in the field of energy, 
which invites thinking about sound approaches to entrepreneurship amidst uncertainty. A 
single article cannot address the totality of this puzzle, but an exploratory analysis is possible 
through the case of John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company, which faced significant 
uncertainty. Since uncertainty is an important cost of operating in a market, the article 
grounds itself in the TCs literature, which says that entrepreneurs able to manage uncertainty 
are likely to have more success than those that struggle with it. The article then specifies 
expectations by noting that energy entrepreneurs are bound to be challenged by uncertainty 
associated with five prominent energy security challenges: availability, accessibility, 
adaptability, acceptability, and affordability (4A+A).  
The analysis reveals that Standard succeeded with a sequential approach whereby it 
internalised the contextual uncertainty associated with all 4A+A factors and then used this to 
manage contractual uncertainty. The limitations of a single case analysis forbid claims of 
completeness or generalisation. Limitations notwithstanding, however, the analysis casts 
doubt on the view of uncertainty as inherently harmful, showing that there is opportunity in 
uncertainty. Additionally, the case holds referential value and signals room for further 
research in various ways such as, for example, the possibility of Standard’s strategies being 
the or a robust way to manage uncertainty. 
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